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ABSTRACT
The percentage of the workforce affected by occupational licensing has
grown nationally and in public education. In assessing educational
attainment and quality, there is little evidence that licensing has improved
the learning outcomes of children, but the regulations may benefit wealthier
schools and districts relative to poorer ones. The paper argues for a
movement to the certification of teachers that would allow districts greater
flexibility in choosing who can teach, but with more monitoring and greater
incentives for educational attainment to ensure quality teachers are
employed as a key element in learning.
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"Advocates of teacher professionalization are unapologetic about the
prospects of higher salaries. In their view, the nation has undervalued the
services teacher provide and has not spent enough to recruit and retain good
teachers. If high standards compel state and local governments to increase
teacher salaries, that is only what they ought to have done anyway."'
INTRODUCTION
The market for United States public education is often perceived as a
monopoly, with few options for students or their parents. Consequently,
from an economics perspective in the market for public education, there are
opportunities for the various stakeholders to gain benefits as a consequence
of their monopoly position.2 For students and their parents, the structure of
the public education market suggests a need to monitor and put pressure on
school boards and their employees to induce training, better facilities, or
greater effort by teachers and administrators to enhance the quality of
education and induce better outcomes for students. Ambitious
administrators can use discretion to enhance their careers by providing
benefits to supportive teachers or members of the board of education. This
use can lead, in turn, to greater employment opportunities and salaries for
school administrators through the use of those funds. Teachers can gain
access to excess profits through concerted activities. Finally, teacher unions
raise wages and benefits through organizing and the collective bargaining
process.
The studies published through the National Bureau of Economic
Research's estimates on collective bargaining in the public sector showed,
on average, teachers unions raise wages by about seven percent, but found
no wage effect for licensing.3 Moreover, unions are able to provide voice
benefits and maintain control of the allocation of work, including lobbying
for the implementation of tougher licensing provisions for teachers. The
process includes the assignment of teachers with certain types of licenses to
schools and to individual classrooms. The length of the workday and work
effort through class size are also subject to the bargaining process and state
regulators.
To the extent that licensing can restrict the supply of teachers, it has the
ability to enhance the benefits offered by school administrators through
1. Dale Ballou & Michael Podgursky, Gaining Control of Professional Licensing and
Advancement, in CONFLICTING MISSIONS? TEACHERS UNIONS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 82
(Tom Loveless ed., 2000).
2. For economists, monopoly markets may result in economic rents, or higher than market
profits, as a consequence of the monopoly power of public schools in public education.
3. Morris M. Kleiner & Daniel L. Petree, Unionism and Licensing of Public School
Teachers: Impact on Wages and Educational Output, in WHEN PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS
UNIONIZE 305-22 (Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski eds., 1988).
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negotiations. In most public sector bargaining, on the terms and conditions
of employment in education, health benefits and pensions are quite
generous relative to workers with similar base pay in the private sector.
Through benefits that are often tied to longevity, public school teachers are
able to obtain security and retire relatively young through the negotiations
that are part of the collective bargaining process.
Unions can use the collective bargaining process to enhance their
ability to obtain tougher regulation of occupations. For example, an item for
negotiations is the school board support for occupational regulation, such as
increasing the classes necessary to become a licensed teacher. Moreover,
teachers unions can, through the political process, directly lobby for and
obtain some form of occupational regulation statutes at the state level.
Occupational regulation generally takes three forms-registration,
certification, and licensure. The least restrictive form is registration, in
which individuals file their names, addresses, and qualifications with a
government agency before practicing their occupation. The registration
process may include posting a bond or filing a fee. In contrast, certification
permits any person to perform the relevant tasks, but the government-or
sometimes a private, nonprofit agency-administers an examination and
certifies those who have achieved the requisite level of skill and knowledge.
For example, travel agents and car mechanics are generally certified, but
not licensed. The most stringent form of regulation is licensure, which is
often referred to as "the right to practice." Under licensure laws, working in
an occupation for compensation without first meeting government standards
is illegal and usually involves fines, imprisonment, or both. In 2003, the
Council of State Governments estimated that more than eight hundred
occupations were licensed in at least one state, and more than eleven
hundred occupations were either licensed, certified, or registered.4 Public
sector teachers often lobby for the toughest form of regulation, licensing,
and for increasing requirements once licensing is in place.'
WHY LICENSE?
The general rationale for licensing is the health and safety of
consumers. Beyond that, the quality of service delivery and the safety of
workers within the occupations are sometimes invoked. The simplest theory
of occupational licensing emphasizes the administrative procedural role of
licensing. It perceives a costless supply of unbiased, capable gatekeepers
and enforcers. Milton Friedman questioned the assumption of unbiased
4. COUNCIL ON LICENSURE, ENFORCEMENT, AND REGULATION, 21 Century Regulation:
"Show Me" What Works (Prepared for CLEAR's 24"h Annual Conference, Kansas City, MO,
Sep. 30-Oct. 2, 2004), http://www.clearhq.org/resources/2004_conference-sessions.htm.
5. See Dale Ballou & Michael Podgursky, Teacher Recruitment and Retention in Public and
Private Schools, 17 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 393 (1998).
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gatekeepers and enforcers. He viewed licensing's entry restrictions as
creating undesirable monopoly rents. Friedman argued that gatekeepers and
enforcers are self-interested because licensing systems are almost always
run by incumbents. Their vested interests lead them to not only create
monopoly rents through restrictions on entry, but also to limit complaints
and disciplinary procedures against most incumbents.6 For teachers,
regulation might establish general years of schooling, specific numbers of
hours of education classes, practice teaching, taking and passing an exam,
and having substantial requirements for potential applicants from other
states.
An alternative view is that licensing requirements can take the form of
unspecified fixed costs of entry to the job that are controlled by the
licensing authority, but is similar to the unbiased gatekeeper. The skill and
quality of the licensed worker affects the relative cost of producing high
quality services, and licensing takes the more specific form of a minimal
human capital requirement. In this context, licensing could result in
enhancing the stated objective of raising the overall quality of the service
and protecting the public. In practice, the fixed costs would consist of
requirements that entrants and incumbents take job-specific training
programs or pass an exam. These models of thinking about regulation
resemble the ones above in predicting that both the average quality, and the
average prices or earnings, from the services within the regulated industry
will rise as licensing requirements are implemented or tightened. The
results are benefits for those who want higher quality and have the funds to
pay for it, but at a cost to those who are in lower quality service markets.
Consequently, licensing would benefit school districts that are wealthy and
can afford higher quality teachers. On the other hand, poorer districts or
ones in rural areas with a low tax base would have to pay more for teachers
than they would if they were left to choose teachers without the
requirements of licensing.
Growth of Regulation
During the early 1950s, less than five percent of the U.S. workforce was
covered by licensing laws at the state level.7 That number grew to almost
eighteen percent by the 1980s-with an even larger number if federal, city
and county occupational licensing are included. According to data gathered
from the Department of Labor and the 2000 Census, at least twenty percent
of the workforce had occupations licensed by states. By 2006, twenty-nine
percent of workers said they were required to have a government-issued
6. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (Univ. Chi. Press 2002) (1962).
7. SIDNEY SPECTOR & WILLIAM FREDERICK, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLATION IN
THE STATES (The Council of State Governments 1952).
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license to do their job, compared with only twelve percent who said they
were union members.8 Certified public accountants and nurses are among
licensed occupations that have similar education or service related functions
as teachers.
During the same period, from the 1950s until 2007, government
regulations for becoming a public school teacher also increased
significantly. At the beginning of the period, there were few requirements
with virtually no tests for becoming a teacher. However, during the 1980s,
teachers unions, as represented by the National Education Association
(NEA), and to a lesser extent the American Federation of Teachers (AFT),
began driving for more stringent licensing of teachers. This led to higher
requirements for entry into the occupation, although fewer than half of the
states had full-fledged licensing statutes during the 1980s.' More recently,
all states have adopted licensing requirements for teachers that have general
education requirements.'0 The impact on educational quality of these new
provisions is mixed."
As employment in the U.S. economy shifted from manufacturing to
service industries, which typically have lower union representation, the
members of those occupations frequently established formal standards that
governed their members. For a professional association, obtaining licensing
legislation requires raising funds from members of the occupation to lobby
the state legislature, especially the chairs of appropriate committees. In
addition, the occupation association often solicits volunteers from its
membership to work on legislative campaigns. With financial contributions,
political action committees and volunteers, and occupational associations,
such as the NEA or AFT, have a significant ability to influence legislation,
especially when opposition to regulatory legislation is absent or minimal. 2
Members of an occupation generally seek to obtain licensing of the
profession, since licensing imposes state sanctioned barriers to new entrants
within the state and to interstate mobility. Although mobility may have
benefits for teachers nationally, for teachers within a state, it is a way of
imposing barriers to mobility from teachers in other states and maintaining
barriers to entry within a state. Regulation increases the perception of a
8. Morris Kleiner & Alan Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing,
48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 676, 676-687 (Dec. 2010).
9. Kleiner & Petree, supra note 3.
10. This includes years of schooling, numbers of education classes, student teaching and
exams, as well as reciprocity provisions for teachers from other states.
11. Daniel D. Goldhaber, Teacher Licensure and the Quality of Teacher Workforce: Some
Thoughts on the Gateway Governing Entry into the Teaching Profession (Prepared for Changing
Governance Systems to Improve Teaching Quality, a conference sponsored by the Education
Commission of the States (ECS), March 2003).
12. Charles J. Wheelan, Politics or Public Interest? Licensing and the Case of Respiratory
Therapists, 8 PERSPECTIVES ON WORK, 42,42-43 (2005).
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higher quality good that would enhance the demand for the service. For the
major administrators of the professional association, such as the NEA, the
resulting increase in responsibility, revenues from dues, and continuing
education seminars, usually results in an increase in pay. Most licensing
provisions across states require continuing education classes for fees, which
are usually administered by the professional association, and generate
revenues for the occupation association. For the union, licensing members
of the occupation strengthens its position in collective bargaining by
restricting the number of teachers and enhancing the academic quality of
the individuals in the profession.
The executive branch of government, which is represented by the
governor, also sees little reason to oppose occupational regulation. Within
most state agencies, the fees generated from licensing for an occupation are
generally substantially higher than the costs of monitoring the occupation.
The excess funds can be used to help balance the state budget, provide for
small projects that the governor favors, or to curry favor with legislators or
politically active constituents.
There has been occasional opposition to licensing legislation from
politically active groups such as Common Cause, American Association of
Retired Persons (AARP), and the Institute for Justice, who typically
challenge such legislation through the judicial process. For example, the
Institute for Justice, through legal proceedings, has won a Minnesota
Supreme Court case that held hair braiders are not covered under the
cosmetologist's licensing statute and can therefore work with no state
regulation. 3 In general, however, the opposition has not been effective in
stopping the implementation of licensing legislation. Since members of the
occupation want licensing provisions and have support from the legislative
and executive branches of government, it is not surprising that occupational
regulation has been among the fastest growing labor market institutions.
EVIDENCE OF THE INFLUENCE OF LICENSING ON QUALITY AND
COMPETITION WITH APPLICATIONS TO PUBLIC EDUCATION
The incentives for occupations to restrict supply and create barriers to
entry create consequences for consumers of the regulated service. If
occupation regulation operates through state level teacher pass rates, more
restrictive licensing statues, and reciprocity agreements with other states to
restrict the entry of new practitioners, then there is a possibility of both
higher quality teachers and higher costs to school districts or through state
property taxes. Furthermore, licensing boards react to changes in
constituent demand by changing administrative procedures through the pass
13. Bd. of Barber & Cosmetologist Examiners, OAH No. 15-1007-17009-1, Minn. R. 2100,
2105, 2110 (2010).
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rate or for new entrants coming from other states. As Goldhaber states,
"The signal value of licensure test performance for teachers in the
workforce is an important policy issue, as local school districts might wish
to use this signal in helping to make hiring decisions." 4
Similar regulatory factors are presumed to influence the quality of the
service by prohibiting lower quality practitioners from entering the
occupation. If the pass rate is reduced or the educational requirements are
augmented, the practitioners entering or remaining in the occupation are
theoretically of higher quality. Several research studies have attempted to
develop methods of estimating the impact of licensing on quality or the
demand for licensed services with a focus on education. For example, it has
been found that tougher forms of regulation have murky effects on quality
or the demand for the service. 5 More recent studies using micro data find
that mean quality of test scores is increased. Evidence by Goldhaber and
Cotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor find generally a small influence of licensing
tests or pre-hire mandated qualifications on test scores.' 6 In education, the
growth of occupational licensing over the past two decades has resulted in
slightly positive to no effects on student test scores, a generally recognized
measure of "quality" in education.
In the absence of any theory or evidence to the contrary, I assume that
the stringency of professionally administered quality controls, such as
licensure, is a proxy for quality as recognized by the consumer of the
service and would likely enhance the price of the service. On the other
hand, higher service prices would reduce the overall service rendered, as
fewer students, in the case of educational services, would use the service.
This means fewer classes, such as band and physical education, and larger
class sizes in core classes that include math and English. Consequently,
those who receive the higher quality service would benefit, but lower
income individuals who do not receive the service would lose because
prices and taxes for public education would rise under licensing. The net
effect of regulation on service quality and its cost-effectiveness is therefore
unclear.
Although the net impacts of occupational licensing may be negative for
all users of the service, for certain segments of the population, namely those
14. Daniel D. Goldhaber, Everyone's Doing It, But What Does Teacher Testing Tell Us
About Teacher Effectiveness? 39 (Urban Institute, Working Paper, 2006), available at
http://www.caldercenter.org/about/GoldhaberPubs.cfm.
15. Kleiner & Petree, supra note 3; Joshua Angrist & Jonathan Guryan, Does Teacher
Testing Raise Teacher Quality? Evidence from State Certification Requirements 14-15 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9545, 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9545.
16. Goldhaber, supra note 14; Charles T. Clotfelter, Helen F. Ladd & Jacob L. Vigdor,
Teacher Credentials and Student Achievement in High School: A Cross-Subject Analysis with
Student Fixed Effects 60 (Urban Institute, Working Paper No. 11, 2007).
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individuals with higher incomes or insurance coverage, this form of
regulation results in higher quality. Moreover, licensing may further serve
to exacerbate the variation in the relative quality of service received or
"consumption" by lower income individuals relative to those with higher
incomes.
AN OVERVIEW OF RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE BENEFITS OF
OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION
Studies of demand for occupational regulation have attempted to
overcome the problem of variability in outcomes by making quality
adjustments based on occupational human capital characteristics and ability
of the persons providing the service. There is no assurance, however, that
the services actually received by consumers are positively correlated with
these proxy measures of input productivity, and the distinction between the
number of inputs employed and the quality of outputs received may not be
consistent. For example, a less competent teacher may require multiple
attempts to explain a concept that a more skilled teacher could accomplish
at once. Furthermore, there is little to no published research on the
relationship between performance on a licensing exam and an individual's
ability to perform on the job.'7
In field studies of the impacts of licensing on quality, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) used field experiments to examine the relationship
between licensing and outcomes to consumers. These studies ranged from
optometry to television repair, and found zero or negative influences on
quality. Overall, these studies of demand and quality indicate that there are
few cases that show significant benefits of occupational regulation. For
example, Kleiner and Kudrle find no impact of tougher licensing for
dentists and Kleiner and Todd find generally negative influences for
mortgage brokers on foreclosures and higher loan prices." A more
convincing study, however, would provide a randomized experiment of
consumers going to unlicensed versus regulated service providers and then
measure the outcomes of the service. Unfortunately, this type of analysis
has not been implemented. Instead, most analysis of licensing examines
more highly regulated regimes relative to less regulated ones. In these cases
17. Since licensure tests are not trying to measure performance but rather competence there
has been virtually no work on this topic by psychologists. The Standards for Educational and
Psychological Testing (American Educational Research Association, 1999) notes that for licensure
testing one relies on "content validity" (whether the test samples a specified "content domain") as
opposed to "criterion-related validity" (whether the test correlates with subsequent performance).
18. Morris M. Kleiner & Richard T. Todd, Mortgage Broker Regulations That Matter:
Analyzing Earnings, Employment, and Outcomes for Consumers, STUDIES OF LABOR MARKET
INTERMEDIATION 183-231, (David Autor, ed., 2009), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3684; Morris M. Kleiner & Robert T. Kudrle, Does Regulation
Affect Economic Outcomes?: The Case of Dentistry, 43 J.L. & ECON. 547, 547 (2000).
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the results show that licensing has modest to no effects on the demand for
the service or on the quality of service received by consumers other than
thorough potential price effects.
QUALITY EFFECTS AS MEASURED THROUGH INSURANCE PREMIUMS
One method of determining whether licensing has an impact on the
quality of a service is through the premiums charged to individuals in
regulated and unregulated states for malpractice insurance. The rationale for
this evaluation is that if licensing serves to keep out incompetent potential
practitioners relative to states that do not have licensing, then there would
be a reduction in law suits which could lead to lower premiums. In an
interview, officials at the Chubb Insurance Company expressed the view
that licensing makes an occupation more visible and sets up rules and
regulations that make law suits easier to file. The impact of this more
structured procedure is to drive up premiums. The greater visibility for the
occupation, and the greater ability to file law suits due to licensing's
structure, compensates for any benefits from the quality aspects of licensing
from the perspective of the insurance industry. The results for a number of
professional organizations showed that insurance companies do not think
that licensing reduces the likelihood of malpractice claims due to
incompetent or unscrupulous practitioners. Although the analysis was not
implemented specifically for teachers, there is no apparent reason that
estimates for professionals who are occupational therapists, psychologists
or nurses would be much different. 9
EVIDENCE ON RESTRICTING THE SUPPLY OF TEACHERS
Perhaps as a consequence of the market structure of their employer,
teachers have not been able to significantly enhance their earnings through
licensing. Unlike doctors, dentists and lawyers, teachers work primarily for
large institutions such as school boards. School administrators have
incentives to reduce costs within their organization and likely put pressure
on legislatures to ease licensing restrictions to ensure an ample supply of
practitioners as a countervailing force.
Estimates that I have developed for a number of occupations show that,
with the exception of teachers, all have some positive earning effects from
occupational licensing relative to their selected "opportunity cost"
occupations.20 This would include not only the cost of obtaining additional
education, but also the forgone earnings of continuing to work in the
occupation. This is true even though public school teaching has been one of
19. MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENHANCING QUALITY OR
RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 56-58 (2006).
20. Id. at 71-75.
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the fasting growing areas of licensing growth and increasing restrictions on
entry. Licensing the teaching occupation is a relatively new phenomenon in
comparison with the other occupations, such as law and the medical
professions, as most of the states began to engage in tougher licensing
standards for teachers during the 1980s. Licensing with state administered
exams only became the norm during the 1990s. Although some recent
analysis has suggested that the regulation of teachers has had little quality
effect as measured by human capital, there has been little analysis of the
impact of regulation in similar occupations.2'
In all licensed occupations individuals who attempt to move to the state
from elsewhere are met with a further set of requirements. These
requirements include similar general and specific statutory education
requirements to those for new teachers, but with several exceptions. Often
times, out of state applicants must retake certain specific parts of the
original licensing exam to practice in a new state. As an alternative to
retaking the state exam some states require working with a licensed
practitioner to ensure the out of state applicant follows current state
procedures. Reciprocity agreements establish virtual "treaties" between
states that allow them to accept each other's licensed practitioners without
additional education or tests. The statutes and agreements with other
political entities vary from accepting any applicant from another state who
has a valid license to endorsement, to acceptance of applicants if they meet
the entry requirements in force at the time of initial licensure, to currently in
force within the state, to reciprocity only with states that have signed
agreements.22 In allowing licensed practitioners from other states or
countries to enter and work within their political jurisdiction, states have
established different rules for different occupations. For teachers, lack of
reciprocity across states would limit mobility. States with tougher barriers
to entry would have both lower in-migration and out-migration. They would
have lower in-migration because tougher restrictions and time for becoming
licensed keep out of state teachers from moving to the state. Moreover,
teachers within the state would be more reluctant to move because the
barriers to entry keep potential migrants out and would raise earnings
relative to other states, and native teachers would stay within the state to
take advantage of these higher earnings.
OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION POLICIES FOR TEACHERS
n Table 1, using data from both federal and state sources, I show the
regulations in 2007 for teachers seeking to work in public education across
2 1. Angnist & Guryan, supra note 15.
22. Morris M. Kleiner, Robert S. Gay and Karen Greene, Barriers to Labor Migration: The
Case of Occupational Licensing, 21 INDUS. REL.: J. ECON. & Soc. 383, 383-391 (1982).
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states, as well as the percentage of teachers not fully licensed by state. The
meaning of unqualified in this context means an unlicensed teacher, or a
teacher that is not a fully licensed teacher. The results show large variations
from more than sixty percent for Alabama to less than one-percent for
North Dakota and Pennsylvania. Many states provide for provisional
licenses to teachers who, for example, work in the Teach for America
(TFA) program or for individuals who are transitioning into teaching from
another occupation. Further, states allow teachers who are working toward,
but have not achieved, full licensing status to teach. This policy is similar to
provisions that are given to certified public accountants who have not
passed all parts of the licensing exam. Analysis by Professor Thomas Kane
and others suggests that new teachers who have provisional licenses and are
transitioning into teaching from programs, that target professionals from
other occupations or highly motivated recent college graduates, do as well
as fully licensed teachers in enhancing the educational achievement of
students in New York and Los Angeles.23 Although the additional
requirements that licensing provides may enhance the ability of teachers
seeking public school instruction as a full time career, easing the
requirements for able instructors may benefit student achievement.
Providing a "one-size-fits-all" approach for the state licensing of school
teachers may not fit the diverse elements and kinds of schools that exist in
particular districts.24 Further, rural districts may have a difficult time
attracting highly qualified teachers. Urban schools in high crime or low
income areas may also find it difficult to find and attract fully licensed
teachers.
CONCLUSIONS AND POTENTIAL PUBLIC POLICIES ON OCCUPATIONAL
REGULATION
Occupational regulation has grown significantly in the U.S. over the
past sixty years to encompass almost thirty percent of the workforce. Part of
the growth has been the result of a movement toward a service-oriented
economy, which is less influenced by labor unions. State regulation of these
occupations has been serving as a substitute for the "web of rules" usually
created by unions through collective bargaining. Teachers and their unions
have been following the trend towards seeking state regulation. The legal
requirements for being a public school teacher have increased and now may
encompass residency requirements, tests, and a variety of general and
23. Thomas J. Kane, Jonah E. Rockoff & Douglas 0. Staiger, What Does Certification Tell
Us About Teacher Effectiveness? Evidence From New York City, 27 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 615-
631 (2008).
24. Daniel D. Goldhaber, Why Do We License Teachers?, in A QUALIFIED TEACHER IN
EVERY CLASSROOM? APPRAISING OLD ANSWERS AND NEW IDEAS 81-100 (Frederick M. Hess,
Andrew J. Rotherham & Kate Walsh eds., 2004).
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specific educational requirements. These mandated licensing requirements
have resulted in wealthier urban districts being able to attract the highly
qualified teachers who more than meet the standards for licensure. On the
other hand, districts with geographic or cultural challenges face a difficult
time recruiting fully licensed teachers, who may be lured away by districts
with more amenities. If the pool only consists of licensed teachers, then
poorer districts have to eliminate programs or increase class sizes, and as a
consequence may reduce the quality of education provided to their students.
Teachers in states such as Minnesota engage in active public relations
campaigns to only approve licensed teachers for both full time and
substitute teachers. These types of campaigns, if successful, can lead to
larger class sizes and fewer options for TFA or other innovations using
nontraditional instructors for public education.
Unlike licensed doctors who work independently or often in small
groups, public school teachers work for state-regulated school districts,
where monitoring is heavy and requirements well-specified. Moreover,
licensed physicians work where the health and safety of the patient is
sometimes at stake, and the cost of the misdiagnosis of diseases can be
costly to the patient and to the community. In general, the argument for
licensing physicians is stronger than for the regulation of teachers because
the social cost of unethical or unscrupulous doctors to society is much
greater than for teachers.
As Ballou and Podgursky suggest in the opening quotation to this
paper, teacher salaries may rise as a consequence of licensing and attract
more highly skilled individuals." However, the costs of licensing through
the "fencing out" of skilled practitioners who are able and committed to
teaching may be greater than the benefits of individuals selecting to enter
the profession as a result of higher salaries.
An alternative to licensing that may aid many districts and their
students is certification. With certification, information would be given to
the school district on the qualifications of the teacher including degrees
obtained, good moral character, and any relevant general or specific human
capital education characteristics. School districts would have the
opportunity to hire school teachers who may not meet all the formal
requirements for licensing. This policy would increase the potential supply
of able teachers by allowing new college graduates who are in the TFA
program and other professionals who are transitioning into teaching as a
second or third career to obtain permanent teaching positions without the
expense and difficulty of meeting licensing requirements. The individuals
in these programs do at least as well as more heavily regulated teachers in
25. Ballou & Podgursky, supra note 1.
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enhancing student performance.2 6 School districts would have more choice
and could select teachers based on the fit within the district rather than state
licensing where the requirements may not be necessary to meet the needs of
the school district, where math, business, and the sciences are in high
demand. If certification were to take the place of licensing, even greater
accountability would need to be in place for public schools. Tests of
students and graduation rates would need to be monitored more closely.
Additionally, high and low powered financial work-based incentives would
need to be implemented for administrators and their teachers to motivate
their students to achieve academically. The "production," however, of high
quality students would be the objective, and the districts could decide where
and what types of teachers and other auxiliary employees would be
necessary to achieve these objectives. Certification would be more effective
than state licensing in meeting these focused objectives since it provides
government sanctioned monopolies on the supply of labor. In contrast,
certification would provide useful information on the quality of the teacher,
but it would not fix the requirement for all teachers.
26. Kane, Rockoff& Staiger, supra note 23.
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Table 1: Licensing Requirements by State:
Evaluation Year 2007
Teachers (Elementary)
Occupation Percent not
State, 2007 specific Exam Reciprocity* fully licensed
education
Alabama (A) Yes Yes, NASDTEC 64.7% (C)
Alaska Yes Yes, NASDTEC 3 1. 1% (D)
Arizona (13) Yes Yes, NASDTEC 1.5% (D)
Arkansas (B) Yes Yes, NASDTEC 5%(D)
California Yes Yes, NASDTEC 10% (D)
Colorado (B) Yes Yes, NASDTEC 7.89% (D)
Connecticut Yes Yes, NASDTEC 3.2% (D)
Delaware Yes Yes, NASDTEC 11.4% (D)
Florida Yes Yes, NASDTEC 7.7% (D)
Georgia Yes Yes, NASDTEC 2.9% (D)
Hawaii Yes Yes, NASDTEC 11% (D)
Idaho Yes Yes, NASDTEC 0.59% (D)
Illinois (B) Yes Yes, NASDTEC and Midwest 5.48% (D)
Indiana (B) Yes Yes, NASDTEC 9.1% (D)
Iowa (1) Yes Yes, Midwest 1.4% (D)
Kansas (1) Yes Yes, NASDTEC and Midwest 2.9% (D)
Kentucky Yes Yes, NASDTEC 3.1% (D)
Louisiana Yes Yes, NASDTEC Unavailable
Maine Yes Yes, NASDTEC 5% (D)
Maryland Yes Yes, NASDTEC 12.7% (D)
Massachusetts Yes Yes, NASDTEC 2.11% (D)
Michigan (B) Yes Yes, NASDTEC and Midwest 3% (D)
Minnesota (B) Yes SEE BOTTOM 3.87% (D)
Mississippi Yes Yes, NASDTEC 7% (D)
Missouri (B) Yes Yes, Midwest 3.6% (D)
Montana Yes Yes, NASDTEC 0.4% (D)
Nebraska (B) Yes Yes, Midwest 0.35% (D)
Nevada Yes Yes, NASDTEC 19.62% (D)
New
mhw Yes Yes, NASDTEC 2.7% (D)Hampshire
New Jersey Yes Yes, NASDTEC 4.1% (D)
New Mexico (B) Yes Yes, NASDTEC 6.2% (D)
New York Yes Yes, NASDTEC Unavailable
North Carolina Yes Yes, NASDTEC 11% (D)
North Dakota (B) Yes Yes, NASDTEC 0.35% (D)
Ohio (B) Yes Yes, NASDTEC 18% (C)
Oklahoma (B) Yes Yes, NASDTEC and Midwest 7.45% (D)
Oregon Yes Yes, NASDTEC 5.15% (D)
Pennsylvania Yes Yes, NASDTEC 0.78% (D)
Rhode Island Yes Yes, NASDTEC 19% (D)
South Carolina Yes Yes, NASDTEC 8% (D)
South Dakota (B) Yes Yes, Midwest 15.8% (D)
Tennessee Yes Yes, NASDTEC 6.17% (D)
No. 2] Enhancing Quality or Restricting Competition
Occupation Percent not
State, 2007 specific Exam Reciprocity* fully licensed
education
Texas Yes Yes, NASDTEC 2.29% (D)
Utah Yes Yes, NASDTEC 4.1% (D)
Vermont Yes Yes, NASDTEC 8% (C)
Virginia Yes Yes, NASDTEC 3.5% (D)
Washington Yes Yes, NASDTEC 2.1% (D)
Washington DC Yes Yes, NASDTEC 43.8% (D)
West Virginia (B) Yes Yes, NASDTEC 5.8% (D)
Wisconsin (B) Yes Yes, Midwest 1.1% (D)
Wyoming (B) Yes Yes, NASDTEC 4.4% (D)
Content field contains math, social studies, science, English, physical development, the fine arts
Combined with Lib Ed
(A): Teachers with elementary licensure must have 12 semester hours in the content field(s),
appropriately distributed
(B): Student teacher programs vary by the college or university offering the program
(C): found in article http://www2.edutrust.org/NR/rdonlyres/C638111 D-04E3-4COD-9F68-
20E709498A6/O/tellingthetruthteachers.pdf
(D): found in HQT Revised State Plans
http://www.ed.gov/programs/teacherqual/hqtplans/index.html
I I II
The North Central Association of Colleges and Schools (NCA) accredits all types of schools.
Accredited K- 12 schools agree to meet minimum standards that encompass, among other things,
qualifications for teachers
NASDTEC: National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and Certification
Minnesota does not have licensure reciprocity with other states.
* Editor's Note: Due to space restrictions, this table was mocfiedfrom its original format and
phrases were substituted. Thus:
"NASDTEC" signifies the originalphrase, "with all states that recognize the NASDTEC
Interstate Contract";
"Midwest" has replaced "with all states that recognize the Midwest Regional Exchange";
and
"NASDTEC and Midwest" has replaced "with all states that recognize the NASDTEC
Interstate Contract and the Midwest Regional Exchange".
